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This paper provides experimental evidence on the relationship between social
preferences and cognitive abilities, which we measure using the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT). We elicit social preferences by way of 24 dictatorial situations, in which the
Dictator’s choice sets include (i) standard Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator’s
payoff yields a loss for the Recipient, (ii) efficient Dictator games, where increasing the
Dictator’s payoff also increases that the Recipient’s; as well as other situations in which (iii)
either the Dictator’s or (iv) the Recipient’s monetary payoff is held constant. We partition
our subject pool into three groups: reflective (scoring 2 or more in the CRT), impulsive
(opting twice or more for the “intuitive” but wrong answers in the CRT) and the remainder.
We find that impulsive Dictators show a marked inequity aversion attitude, especially
in standard Dictator Games. By contrast, reflective Dictators show lower distributional
concerns, except for the situations in which the Dictators’ payoff is held constant. In this
case, reflective Dictators give significantly more.
Keywords: cognitive reflection, social preferences, experimental economics, behavioral economics, dictator
games
JEL Classification: C7, C91, D30, D63
Introduction
Researchers have made substantial improvements in understanding the relationship between
various measures of cognitive ability and economic behavior in different domains. In this respect,
measures of cognitive ability have been shown to determine the degree of strategic sophistication
(e.g., Rydval et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Carpenter et al., 2013) and appear to correlate
with risk and time preferences (Frederick, 2005; Brañas-Garza et al., 2008; Burks et al., 2009;
Dohmen et al., 2010; Andersson et al., 2013; Benjamin et al., 2013), as well as with heuristics and
well-known behavioral biases in financial decisions, such as overconfidence, anchoring or the so-
called conjunction fallacy (Oechssler et al., 2009; Bergman et al., 2010; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011;
Toplak et al., 2011).
Despite that there have been noteworthy advances in the literature on pro-social behavior over
the last years, the relation between social preferences and cognitive abilities is still sparse and far
from univocal. Chen et al. (2013) find that subjects who perform better in the Math portion of the
SAT (formerly referred as the Scholastic Aptitude Test) are more generous in both the Dictator
Game and in a series of small-stakes “dictatorial” (i.e., unilateral) decisions, known as Social
Value Orientation (SVO), albeit subjects with higher Grade Point Average (GPA) outcomes tend
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to be more selfish in dictator decisions. This latter result is in
line with those of Ben-Ner et al. (2004) or Brandstätter and
Güth (2002), who find a negative relationship between giving in a
Dictator Game and performance on cognitive tests. By contrast,
Benjamin et al. (2013) find that school test scores do not affect
the Dictator’s giving and, somewhat related, Hauge et al. (2009)
argue that the effect of cognitive load on giving “is small if at all
existing. . . ” (p. 15)1.
Prompted by the paucity of clear-cut evidence in the field,
this paper aims at shedding light on the relation between pro-
social attitudes and cognitive abilities. To this aim, we borrow
the design and the experimental evidence of Di Cagno et al.
(2013), who set up a complex experimental design to estimate
subjects’ social preferences over utilities, where the latter include
others’ risk and distributional concerns. In their protocol, social
preferences are elicited by submitting 98 subjects to a sequence
of 24 dictatorial “situations,” which differ upon the distributional
characteristics of the Dictator’s choice sets. In Standard Dictator
situations, reducing the Dictator’s monetary payoff yields an
increase of that to the Recipient, as it is usually the case in the
Dictator Game (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994; Andreoni and Miller,
2002). Efficient Dictator situations are such that the Dictators’ and
Recipients’ monetary payoffs move in the same direction. Thus,
whenever the Dictator increases or decreases her own payoff, the
Recipient’s payoff increases or decreases, as well. Di Cagno et al.
(2013) complete the puzzle by considering situations in which
either the Dictator’s or the Recipient’s payoff is held constant over
the entire Dictator’s choice set, so that Only Recipients or Only
Dictators are affected by the Dictators’ decision. This novel design
allows us to explore a wider spectrum of distributional concerns
than what has been usually studied in standard Dictator games.
Cognitive abilities are elicited in our experiment by way of
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005). The CRT
is a 3-item task designed to measure the tendency to override an
intuitive and spontaneous response alternative that is incorrect
and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct
response.
Following Cueva et al. (2015), we partition our Dictator pool
into 3 subgroups (“types”): those characterized by high cognitive
reflection (reflective subjects: 2 right answers or more in the CRT,
about 40% of our subject pool), high cognitive impulsiveness
(impulsive subjects: 2 intuitive, spontaneous incorrect answers
or more in the CRT, about 50% of our subject pool) and
the remainder (others: about 10%). Our evidence shows that
reflective Dictators are more selfish whenever they can increase
their own payoffs, even at the cost of the Recipients’ (i.e.,
Standard Dictator and Dictators Only situations). By contrast,
1Hauge et al. (2009) attempt to see whether the Dictator’s natural instinct is to be
selfish and social preferences require some cognitive reasoning. To that purpose,
the authors ask subjects to memorize numbers of 7 digits, some of which are easy
(hard) to remember, e.g., 1111111 or 1234567 (9325867 or 7591802). Hauge et al.
(2009) fail to find a clear relationship between attitudes to give in different pro-
social tasks (e.g., charitable giving, Dictator Games, etc. . . ) and “cognitive load”
(i.e., the ability to remember more complex numbers). Benjamin et al. (2013)
manipulates also the cognitive resources for evaluating choices to investigate the
effect on risk aversion and discounting. Strategic thinking and the degree of
bounded rationality (as measured by the subject’s performance in a guessing game)
is related to behavior in the dictator game in Arruñada et al. (2015) and Dittrich
and Leipold (2014).
reflective Dictators are more altruistic in situations where their
payoffs are not affected in terms of giving (i.e., Recipients Only
situations). Finally, no significant differences are observed in the
Efficient Dictator situations.
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we also
study the Dictators’ decisions through the lens of the classic
model of social preferences by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
and provide a structural estimation of our Dictators’ envy
(i.e., aversion to inequality experienced from an disadvantaged
position) and guilt (i.e., aversion to inequality experienced from
an advantaged position). Our estimates are conditioned on
Dictators’ cognitive types to show that that inequality aversion—
i.e., positive envy and guilt- is typical of impulsive Dictators,
especially in standard dictatorial situations. By contrast, reflective
Dictators are characterized by negligible social concerns, with the
exception of an unconditional altruistic attitude—i.e., negative
envy and positive guilt- in situations where the Dictator’s payoff is
held constant2. These findings are robust to a different and much
less demanding statistical specification by which the relative
shares of the pie the Dictator allocates to herself and to the
Recipient are regressed against our CRT partition dummies.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 196 students were recruited among the undergraduate
population of LUISS Guido Carli in Rome using the ORSEE
recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). At the beginning of each
experimental session, participants were randomly selected to play
either as Dictators or Recipients in a sequence of distributional
situations, andmaintain their role throughout. Our Dictator pool
consists of 98 subjects (51 female; mean age = 22.6 years; SD =
2.4 years). The experiment was run in Italian, was approved by
the Ethics Committee of LUISS Guido Carli and conformed to
the relevant regulatory standards3.
Task
Subjects are matched in pairs for a total of 24 rounds. In each
round, Dictators see two colored bar graphs with monetary
amounts displayed on the top of each bar, and one slider at
the bottom of the screen4. The Dictator must choose a specific
allocation, γ ∈{0, 0.01, 0.02,..., 1} by moving the slider. An
allocation consists of a pair of monetary prizes, (xD (γ ) , xR (γ )),
with
xi (γ ) = (1− γ ) x
0
i + γ x
1
i , i ∈ {D,R} ,
where xi (γ ) denotes the monetary prize player i receives if the
Dictator chooses allocation γ , and is calculated as the convex
linear combination between the payoffs x0i and x
1
i , coordinates
of the endpoints of the segment which corresponds to the
distributional situation set the Dictator is facing. The latter can
2For a similar approach, see Corgnet et al. (2015).
3Appendix B in Supplementary Material contains a translated version of the
instructions for the phase in which pro social behavior was elicited. This includes
a screenshot for the Dictators’ decision, detailed in Section Task.
4Figure B1 in Appendix B (Supplementary Material) reports a screenshot of the
user interface.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 146
Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara Social preferences and cognitive reflection
move γ along the segment as many times as they want, until she
confirms her choice by pressing the “OK” button.
We denote by θ =
x1D−x
0
D
x1R−x
0
R
, x1R 6= x
0
R, the exchange rate
between the Dictator’s and the Recipient’s payoff across the
Dictator’s choice set. Across all 24 situations, parameters vary
to ensure that Dictators face problems of different distributional
characteristics. In 10 situations, Dictators play a Standard
Dictator situation, where θ < 0. These situations are such that,
by increasing her own payoff, the Dictator lowers that of the
Recipient. The Dictator can increase or decrease both players’
payoff simultaneously -at varying exchange rates- in what we call
Efficient Dictator situations. Dictators face 5 decisions of this type
of game, where θ > 0. In 4 situations, θ = 0 what implies that
the Dictator’s prize stays constant, while the Recipient’s payoff
varies. Finally, 5 situations are such that θ = ∞, so that the
Recipient’s payoff is held constant and only the Dictator’s payoffs
is affected5.
We note that the experimental design makes it possible to
measure a wider variety of the Dictators’ distributional concerns,
since Standard Dictator situations only cover the case of θ < 0,
both in case of the “classic” Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994)
where θ = −1, and also in the case of the so-called “generalized”
Dictator Game employed by Andreoni and Miller (2002), where
θ < 0 will measure the “cost of giving.”
At the end of the phase, one round is picked at random and
both the Dictator and the Recipient are paid according to the
Dictator’s choice in that round.
CRT
During the debriefing phase, among other questions, subjects
are asked to complete the CRT, the well-known three-item
task proposed by Frederick (2005). These questions are meant
to measure the tendency to override an intuitive response
alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection
that leads to the correct response.
CRT1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ___ cents.
Intuitive (Incorrect) Answer: 10 / Correct Answer: 5.
CRT2. If it takes 5 machines 5minutes to make 5 widgets, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
_____ minutes. Intuitive (Incorrect) Answer: 100 /
Correct Answer: 5.
CRT3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover
the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake?_____ days. Intuitive (Incorrect)
Answer: 24 / Correct Answer: 47.
As Frederick (2005) points out, the beauty of the test lies on the
fact that “. . .The three items on the CRT are ‘easy’ in the sense that
their solution is easily understood when explained, yet reaching
the correct answer often requires the suppression of an erroneous
answer that springs ‘impulsively’ to mind.” (p. 27)6.
5The details of specific distributional situations and the between-subject
randomization are reported in Appendix C (Supplementary Material).
6One of the characteristic features of the test, besides its simplicity, is indeed its
relationship with System 1 and System 2 cognitive functioning. “System 1 thinking
Following Frederick (2005), it is standard practice to use
the CRT to build an index -an integer from 0 to 3- by simply
counting the number of correct answers. This score is then used
to partition the subject pool depending on subjects’ individual
degree of “cognitive reflection.” Instances of this approach are
the papers of Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) and Grimm and Mengel
(2012), who split subjects into two groups, depending on whether
their CRT score equals 0 or 3, respectively7.
By this methodology, “impulsive” subjects are defined as those
who perform poorly in the CRT, regardless of whether they
have selected the intuitive answers. To correct for this potential
loss of information, Cueva et al. (2015) introduce a “dual”
measure associated with the CRT, not only along the “reflective”
dimension, but also along the “impulsive” one, as follows:
iCRT = 1 (CRT1 = 10)+ 1 (CRT2 = 100)+ 1 (CRT3 = 24) ,
where 1(.) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if
condition (.) is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. In words, the iCRT
index is meant to capture that the inability to suppress the
erroneous answer, which provides as important information as
the CRT in characterizing our subject pool. In what follows, we
shall use this approach to define reflective subjects as those who
guess two or more correct answers in the CRT. Impulsive subjects
are defined as those who guess two ormore correct answers in the
iCRT. There is a residual subgroup (Others) for the remainder8.
Testable Hypothesis
The chief question we want to investigate is whether subjects
characterized by a different degree of cognitive (ir)reflection
exhibit different distributional concerns, depending on the
nature of the dictatorial situation. The null hypothesis we want
to test can be framed as follows:
H0: In all situations, the behavior of reflective and impulsive
Dictators is the same.
Put it differently, our aim is to test whether (and how) pro-
social behavior can be related to cognitive abilities, and if (and
how) this relation varies across the four distributional situations.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We begin by summarizing our data with regard to CRT
performance.Table 1 reports our Dictators’CRT and iCRT scores
and partitions our dataset by relying on our definition of reflective
(CRT ≥ 2) and impulsive (iCRT ≥ 2) Dictators. We observe that
49 of our 96 Dictators (51%) are impulsive, whereas 40 Dictators
(41.7%) are reflective. These two categories represent roughly
refers to our intuitive system, which is typically fast, automatic, effortless . . .whereas
System 2 refers to reasoning that is slower, effortful, logical . . . ” (see Kahneman,
2011).
7Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) consider the 0, 1 cutoff so that subjects who scored 0 in
the CRT are in a different category that those having 1, 2 or 3 correct answers. The
cutoff in Grimm and Mengel (2012) is 2, 3; i.e., subjects who scored 3 in the CRT
are in a different category that those scoring 0, 1 or 2.
8Somehow related, Noussair et al. (2014) define an Enhanced CRT (ECRT) that
punishes intuitive, spontaneous incorrect answers more severely than all other
incorrect answers. Thus, an erroneous response counts -1 in their index if it was
the spontaneous, intuitive answer, but it counts 0 otherwise.
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TABLE 1 | CRT, iCRT, and Dictators’ types.
Score Dictators’ type
0 1 2 3 Reflective Impulsive Others
CRT 35 21 18 22
40 49 7(36.5%) (21.9%) (18.8%) (22.9%)
(41.7%) (51.0%) (7.3%)
iCRT 25
(26.0%)
22
(22.9%)
27
(28.1%)
22
(22.9%)
93% of our sample, with only 7 subjects being categorized as other
Dictators9.
We now move to our behavioral data. We define σ (γ )
and ρ (γ ) as two ad-hoc proxies for “pro-social” and “selfish”
behavior, respectively. More specifically, σ (γ ) is calculated as the
share of the Recipient’s available pie the Dictator allocates to the
Recipient. The value of ρ(γ ) indicates the share of the Dictator’s
available pie the Dictator allocates to herself.
σ (γ ) =
xR (γ )−min{x
0
R, x
1
R}
abs (x0R − x
1
R)
(1)
ρ(γ ) =
xD (γ )−min{x
0
D, x
1
D}
abs (x0D − x
1
D)
(2)
According to Equation (1), σ (γ ) = 1(σ (γ ) = 0) if the
Dictator gives the Recipient the maximum (minimum) prize
available to the Recipient. By the same token, by Equation (2),
ρ(γ ) = 1(ρ(γ ) = 0) if the Dictator gives herself the maximum
(minimum) prize available.
Both variables σ (γ ) and ρ(γ ) are conditional on the specific
round choice set; i.e., the type of game (θ). In Standard Dictator
situations (θ < 0), the share of the pie that Dictators decide to
give away corresponds to what they do not keep for themselves;
i.e., σ (γ ) = 1 − ρ(γ ). Since the Dictator cannot affect her own
(the Recipient’s) payoff in situations where θ = 0 (θ = ∞), the
values of ρ(γ ) (σ (γ )) , in these cases, are not defined. Finally, in
Efficient Dictator situations (θ > 0) we have σ (γ ) =ρ (γ ) because
Dictators increase or decrease their own payoff if and only if they
increase or decrease the payoff to the Recipient.
In Table 2 we report the correlation coefficients for the
relationship between the Dictator’s behavior in each type of
game (θ) and cognitive abilities (i.e., the score in the CRT
and the iCRT). The average values of σ (γ ) and ρ(γ ) across
the different situations are also reported in Table 2 (standard
deviation within brackets), for our partition of reflective and
impulsive Dictators10. Mann-Whitney non-parametric statistics
9The interested reader can see the histograms for the responses to the CRT in
Figure A1 in Appendix A (Supplementary Material). This includes Dictators’ CRT
and iCRT scores disaggregated for gender (Table A1).
10Recall that a total of 7 observations correspond toOther Dictators. For them, the
average value (standard deviation) of σ (γ ) is 0.120 (0.28) in the Standard Dictator
game, 0.649 (0.44) in the Only Recipients game, and 0.892 (0.31) in the Only
Dictators game. In the Only Dictators game, the average value (standard deviation)
of ρ(γ ) is 0.996 (0.02). Figure 2A in Appendix A (Supplementary Material) reports
the distribution of σ (γ ) and ρ(γ ) for each.
are used to test our null hypothesis of no difference in behavior
between that reflective and impulsive Dictators.
The results in Table 2 indicate that a higher score in the CRT
will result in less generous behavior in the Standard Dictator
situations (the opposite being true for the iCRT). This, in turn,
implies that reflective subjects give less than impulsive subjects
in the Standard Dictator situations (0.079 vs. 0.115, MW-test:
2.10, p < 0.036), in line with the empirical evidence in Ben-Ner
et al. (2004) or Brandstätter and Güth (2002)11. In sharp contrast,
reflective subjects give significantly more than impulsive when
the Dictator’s payoff is held constant and only Recipients’ payoffs
is affected (0.742 vs. 0.640,MW-test: 2. 60, p < 0.039). A different
pattern is observed in situations where taking does not affect
the Recipient’s payoff (θ = ∞). In that case, reflective subjects
tend to be more selfish, although differences are only significant
at the 10% level (0.994 vs. 0.977, U-test: 1.67, p < 0.095).
Finally, we do not detect significant differences in aggregate
behavior in Efficient Dictator situations (0.954 vs. 0.953, MW-
test: −0.48, p = 0.631). Thus, when Dictators’ and Recipients’
incentives are aligned, both reflective and impulsive Dictators
opt for the most efficient allocation in the vast majority of
cases.
In Section Robustness Check I. Random-effect Tobit
Regressions, we use random-effect tobit regressions in which
σ (γ ) and ρ(γ ) are regressed against our CRT partition dummies
to show that our findings are robust across different econometric
specifications. We extend our modeling strategy in Section
Robustness Check II. Structural Estimation of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), where we follow Cabrales et al. (2010) to estimate the
model of social preferences proposed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).
Robustness Check I. Random-effect Tobit
Regressions
Table 3 reports our estimates after running random-effect tobit
regressions for σ (γ ) and ρ(γ ) in each type of game. The set
of regressors includes the Dictator’s type (reflective, impulsive,
other), the round in which the decision is made, and the
Dictator’s gender (a dummy variable positive for female)12.
The reported standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by
subject.
As Table 3 shows, reflective subjects give less than impulsive
in the Standard Dictator situations (W = 3.48, p < 0.001),
even after controlling for round and gender (W = 3.99, p <
0.001). The Wald tests confirm the difference in pro-social
behavior, with reflective subjects being more altruistic in the
Only Recipient situations and more selfish in the Only Dictator
11Chen et al. (2013) find in their study that better performance in the SAT
is associated with more generosity, although subjects with higher Grade Point
Averages (GPA) are more selfish in the dictator decisions. As pointed out by one of
the referees, Chen et al. (2013) conjecture that grade point average, unlike SAT
scores, would be closer to an incentivized test of cognitive ability, as it is the
CRT. Along these lines, our findings nicely corroborate the grade point average
result of Chen et al. (2013) for the GPA scores, which are relatively unaffected
by the intrinsic motivation of the subjects. We are thankful to the referee for this
comment.
12Note that we do not include any constant, but the three different dummies for
the Dictator’s type.
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TABLE 2 | CRT and distributional concerns disaggregated for each Game type (θ).
Type of Game Measure Correlation Reflective Impulsive Mann-Whitney
CRT iCRT (1) (2) (1) = (2)
Standard Dictator (θ < 0) σ (γ ) −0.091*** 0.105*** 0.079 (0.22) 0.115 (0.24) −2.10**
Only Recipients (θ = 0) σ (γ ) 0.142*** −0.111** 0.742 (0.41) 0.640 (0.42) 2.06**
Efficient Dictators (θ > 0) σ (γ ) = ρ(γ ) 0.037 −0.002 0.954 (0.18) 0.952 (0.18) −0.09
Only Dictators (θ = ∞) ρ(γ ) 0.099** −0.080* 0.994 (0.04) 0.977 (0.11) 1.67*
N 96 96 40 49
The first two columns report the correlation coefficients for the relationship between the Dictator’s behavior and CRT and iCRT scores, respectively. The last column reports the results
of Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests where the null hypothesis states that means are constant across CRT types. Significance at the ***1%, **5%, *10% level.
TABLE 3 | Random-effect tobit regression for σγ and ργ in each type of game.
Standard dictator (θ < 0) Only recipient (θ = 0) Efficient dictator (θ > 0) Only dictator (θ = ∞)
σ (γ ) σ (γ ) σ (γ ) σ (γ ) σ (γ ) σ (γ ) ρ (γ ) ρ (γ )
Reflecitve (R) −0.719*** −0.651*** 1.759*** 1.929*** 3.103*** 2.926*** 2.296*** 2.137***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.27) (0.53) (0.52) (0.33) (0.30)
Impulsive (I) −0.454*** −0.333*** 1.154*** 1.462*** 3.003*** 2.686*** 1.889*** 1.602***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.22) (0.26) (0.51) (0.51) (0.25) (0.22)
Others −0.535*** −0.445*** 1.310*** 1.614*** 2.469*** 2.148*** 2.211*** 1.980***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.40) (0.42) (0.59) (0.59) (0.43) (0.41)
Round −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 0.001 0.004 0.017 0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Female −0.179** −0.507** 0.448 0.476***
(0.07) (0.20) (0.29) (0.18)
Wald test (R) = (I) 3.48*** 3.99*** 2.87*** 2.19** 0.35 0.79 2.15** 2.65***
Observations 960 960 480 480 384 384 480 480
The Wald test after each regression is used to test the behavioral hypothesis that reflective and impulsive subjects behave in the same manner. Significance at the ***1%, **5%, *10%
level.
ones. No differences are observed in the Efficient Dictator
situations.
Overall, these results confirm that (i) reflective Dictators are
more selfish when they are allowed to increase their own payoff,
regardless of whether or not Recipients pay a cost for it, and
that (ii) reflective Dictators are more generous when they are not
harmed, in absolute terms, by giving more13.
Robustness Check II. Structural Estimation of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
This section posits that Dictators’ behavior follows the classic
social preference model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According
to this model, the Dictator’s utility, u(.), does not only depend on
her ownmonetary payoff xD (γ ), but also on that of the Recipient,
xR (γ ), as follows:
u(xD (γ ) , xR (γ )) = xD (γ )− αmax {xR (γ )− xD (γ ) , 0}
−βmax {xD (γ )− xR (γ ) , 0}, (3)
13Our findings are robust if we consider instead the score in the CRT as explanatory
variable. See Table A3 in Appendix A (Supplementary Material).
where α and β measure the Dictator’s envy (i.e., aversion to
inequality when receiving less than the Recipient) and guilt (i.e.,
aversion to inequality when receiving more than the Recipient),
respectively.
In what follows, we estimate by maximum likelihood the
unconstrained coefficients of Equation (3) by considering a
multinomial logit model, clustered at the subject level (see
Appendix A in Supplementary Material). Figure 1 provides a
graphic display of our point estimates of α and β for reflective
and impulsive subjects, together with the 95% confidence
interval, for each game type, θ14.
As Figure 1 shows, our estimates for α and β for reflective
Dictators are not significantly different from zero in the standard
Dictator situations (using the Wald test, the null hypothesis
H0 : α = β = 0 cannot be rejected for reflective subjects at
any common significance level, with χ22 = 0.70 and p = 0.706).
This is in contrast with evidence for impulsive subjects (χ22 =
14Appendix A (Supplementary Material), together with a more detailed
description of the structural estimation strategy, reports in Table A4 our estimated
coefficients for all categories, including other Dictators, which are omitted in
Figure 1 for the sake of simplicity.
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FIGURE 1 | Estimates of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in each type of game. Point estimates and confidence intervals for envy (α) and guilt (β) are reported in black
and gray, respectively.
49.30, p < 0.001). These findings suggest that in Standard
Dictator situations inequality aversion is just typical of impulsive
subjects. By contrast, reflective dictators are instead characterized
by “selfish” social preferences, in that both α and β are not
statistically different from 0.
We also find evidence for inequality aversion when the
Dictators’ payoff is held constant, as both α and β are statistically
different from 0 for reflective and impulsive subjects in the Only
Recipients situations (the null hypothesis H0 : α = β = 0 is
rejected for both type of subjects, with p-values being 0.0003 and
0.089, respectively). In addition, we see that α is significantly
smaller for reflective subjects than for impulsive subjects (χ21 =
4.57, p = 0.033), with α being significantly smaller than β for
both type of subjects (in both cases, p < 0.016). These findings
indicate that, although both reflective and impulsive subjects
care about inequality, impulsive Dictators are more envious.
As a result, reflective Dictators tend to be more generous than
impulsive Dictators when choices do not affect their earnings.
This evidence is in line with our analysis in Table 2, as well as our
finding for the Efficient Dictator situations, in which we observe
no significant differences between reflective and impulsive
Dictators with regard to both the values of α (p = 0.427) and
β (p = 0.235). When we analyze the situations where only the
Dictator’s payoff varies, our estimates of α and β for reflective
and impulsive subjects are not significantly different from each
other. Interestingly, the estimate of α is positive and significant
both cases, what indicates that Dictators account for envy (but
not for guilt) when the Recipient’s payoff is held constant.
Discussion
This paper, and the experimental evidence reported herein, lies
between two conflicting views that are well established in the
current economic debate. One of them identifies “rationality”
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with “selfishness” and predicts that highly cognitive subjects
should exhibit less pronounced distributional concerns. The
other one, which appeals to the “too-smart-to-be-selfish” view,
highlights the long-term benefits of altruism (in terms of positive
reciprocity, social efficiency and the like) and calls, consequently,
for a positive relation between cognitive abilities and altruism.
Both views find some empirical support in the -relatively limited-
experimental literature on these matters (take, for example,
Brandstätter and Güth, 2002 for the former and Millet and
Dewitte, 2007 for the latter). Our aim is to present further
evidence in order to contribute to this lively and intriguing
debate.
We consider four different versions of the Dictator Game,
which differ in the way in which Dictators’ and Recipients’
payoffs are affected by the Dictators’ choices. To elicit cognitive
abilities, we rely on our CRT partition into three “cognitive
types.” This, in turn, allows us to tease apart the behavior of
reflective and impulsive Dictators, by relying not only on the
“reflective” dimension of the test, but also on the “impulsive” one.
Our main findings suggest that reflective Dictators are more
selfish than impulsive Dictators in Standard Dictator situations,
in which Dictators increase their own payoffs at the cost of the
Recipient. By contrast, reflective Dictators are more generous
when the “opportunity cost of giving” is comparatively low
(i.e., when being more generous does not affect own payoffs).
Using a parametric approach, we indeed confirm that “inequality
aversion” (i.e., positive α and β) best describes the behavior of
impulsive Dictators in Standard Dictator situations, in which
reflective Dictators show little or no distributional concerns.
By contrast, in situations where the Dictator’s payoff is held
constant, reflective subjects give significantly more (i.e., they are
significantly more guilty and less envious than their impulsive
counterparts). Overall, these findings complement the recent
work of Hauge et al. (2009), who attempt to see whether the
Dictators’ natural instinct is to be selfish and social preferences
require some cognitive reasoning. To that purpose, the authors
investigate whether introducing cognitive load (more specifically,
asking subjects to remember complicated numbers) leads to
more selfish behavior. Our results suggest that subjects who are
impulsive subjects are more inequity averse, whereas reflective
subjects are more selfish, except when there is nothing in it for
them.
Along these lines, there is a stand of the literature in altruism
and evolution that investigates the importance of “intelligence”
on behavior. In this literature, the so-called Neo-Darwinian
theory (see, e.g., Dawkins, 1976) suggests that altruism may be
detrimental as it reduces the one’s fitness while enhancing the
fitness of others. Simon (1993), however, argues that “intelligent
altruists,” although less altruistic than the unintelligent altruists,
“will be fitter than both unintelligent altruists and selfish
individuals” given that human beings are characterized by
bounded rationality and may learn from other individuals what
is good for them (i.e., social influence may grease the wheels
for altruistic behavior)15. Because the CRT has a substantial
correlation with cognitive ability and intelligence (see Frederick,
2005; Kahneman, 2011; Toplak et al., 2011), the CRT measure
nicely contributes to this debate by suggesting that the effect
of cognitive reflection on pro-social behavior is critically linked
to whether (and how) Dictators need to pay the cost of their
supposed “generosity.” We acknowledge, however, that the CRT
is a particular way of measuring intelligence and it has some
distinctive features (Toplak et al. 2011), therefore it may be worth
complementing our findings with those applying alternative
measures of cognitive ability, such as strategic sophistication
(Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
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